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COMMENTS
SECULAR DISSENT: PROTECTING NONBELIEVERS FROM COERCIVE RELIGIOUS
PAROLE PROGRAMS
Phillip Grudzina*
It is common practice for states to contract with third party
organizations to run their parole rehabilitation programs. A majority of
these organizations emphasize religious themes as a means of recovery
from alcohol and substance abuse problems. However, for parolees who
reject a belief in God, there are rarely any secular alternatives available.
Those whom object are often given the choice between forced participation
in religious activities or revocation of their parole. For years, courts have
held that such practices violate parolees’ First Amendment rights.
Nonetheless, most states have failed to implement policies to prevent such
violations from reoccurring. Due to the country’s increasingly secular
population, it is becoming more important that states do so. Existing laws,
such as the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, should be
used to guide new reforms to protect parolees whom object to religious
rehabilitation programs.
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INTRODUCTION
In early 2007, Barry Hazle completed a one-year prison sentence for
methamphetamine possession and was released on parole.1 As a condition
of parole, he was required to complete a residential drug rehabilitation
program approved by the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDOC).2 The only program available in his region used a
version of the so-called “12-Step Program” pioneered by Alcoholics
Anonymous (AA).3 This rehabilitation model required participants to make
various religious affirmations, including a belief in God or higher power.4
As an atheist, Hazle objected to participating in such a program and
requested that he be placed in one with a more secular outlook. But since
the CDOC had not approved other rehabilitation programs in his area, his
parole officer gave him no choice but to participate in the religious one or
return to prison.5 Upon learning of Hazle’s reservations, program staff told
him: “Anything can be your higher power. Fake it till you make it.”6 When
Hazle refused to comply, he was thrown out of the program, declared in
violation of parole, and returned to prison, where he remained for an
additional 100 days.7 After filing suit for First Amendment rights violations
and six years of ensuing litigation, Hazle’s claim was finally vindicated.8
1

Hazle v. Crofoot, 727 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2013).
Id.
3
Id.
4
Kimberly Winston, Barry A. Hazle Jr., Atheist, Should Be Compensated By State For
Religious Rehab, Says Court, HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 27, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2013/08/26/barry-a-hazle-atheist-religious-rehab-california_n_3818833.html.
5
Id.
6
Bob Egelko, Atheist Inmate Settles for $1.95 Million Over 12-Step Drug Rehab,
SFGATE, Oct. 15, 2014, http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Atheist-inmate-settles-for-1-95million-over-5822767.php (internal quotation marks omitted).
7
See Scott Mobley, Judge: Atheist’s rights violated, REDDING RECORD SEARCHLIGHT,
Apr. 8, 2010, http://www.redding.com/news/judge-atheists-rights-violated. Program staff
described Hazle as resisting “in a congenial way.” Id.
8
See Ed Mazza, Barry A. Hazle Jr., Atheist, Wins Nearly $2 Million In Settlement Over
2
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After the Ninth Circuit overturned a jury verdict for failure to award
damages, Hazle settled with the CDOC and the company that managed the
religious rehabilitation program for nearly two million dollars.9
Incidents of this sort are increasingly common for two reasons.10 First,
because atheists, agnostics, and other individuals with heterodox beliefs
(hereinafter “heterodox prisoners” or “heterodox parolees”) have come to
occupy a larger share of America’s religious landscape, it is expected that
First Amendment issues like those that Hazle faced will continue to
increase.11 Although heterodox individuals are generally underrepresented
in prison populations,12 higher societal representation will naturally lead to
a higher raw number of interactions with the criminal justice system and,
specifically, the parole system. Second, and more importantly, the majority
of modern parole programs are not organized or implemented by state
departments of corrections (DOC) or the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP)13
but rather by third-party institutions, a large number of which incorporate
religious teachings and require participating parolees to submit to a higher
power.14 This is because legislatures have sought to offset the financial
Faith-Based Rehab Program, HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 15, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2014/10/15/barry-a-hazle-jr-atheist-settlement_n_5987630.html.
9
Denny Walsh, Shasta atheist wins $2 million settlement over drug program,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 14, 2014, http://www.sacbee.com/news/local/crime/article2768782.
html. The jury found for Hazle on the merits but only awarded nominal damages. Id. CDOC
and the rehabilitation company each paid roughly half of the total settlement figure. Id.
10
See infra notes 31, 39–42 and accompanying discussion for similar incidents.
11
See U.S. Public Becoming Less Religious, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Nov. 3, 2015),
http://www.pewforum.org/2015/11/03/u-s-public-becoming-less-religious/#social-andpolitical-values (finding that the religiously unaffiliated or “nones” are becoming
increasingly secular); see also “Nones” on the Rise, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Oct. 9, 2012),
http://www.pewforum.org/2012/10/09/nones-on-the-rise/ (finding that the percentage of
Americans identifying as either atheist or agnostic increased from 3.7%to 5.7% from 2007 to
2012 while the overall share of religiously unaffiliated grew from 15.3%to 19.6% in the
same period).
12
Mona Chalabi, Are Prisoners Less Likely To Be Atheists?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT, Mar.
12, 2015, http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/are-prisoners-less-likely-to-be-atheists/ (finding
that atheists and agnostics make up only 0.7% of the federal prison population while
accounting for about 5.7% of the overall population).
13
See generally Emily M. Gallas, Endorsing Religion: Drug Courts and the 12-Step
Recovery Support Program, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1063 (2004).
14
The most prevalent religious rehabilitation model is known as the 12-Step Program.
First propagated in the 1930s by American evangelical Bill Wilson, it calls for participants to
make twelve successive commitments in order to achieve sobriety. Of the twelve, seven
involve God, religion, or prayer. Significantly, God is referred to in the singular and
distinguished from the “powerless” alcoholic. Alcoholics Anonymous is the largest
substance-abuse rehabilitation organization in the United States. See generally ALCOHOLICS
ANONYMOUS WORLD SERVICES, ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS: THE STORY OF HOW MANY
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burden associated with containing more prisoners by outsourcing the
administration of parole to such contracting third-party institutions.15 Often,
given the lack of alternative institutions, access to parole is essentially
contingent on the profession or practice of religious faith. This situation has
led to a non-trivial number of individuals—who, like Mr. Hazle, reject
some or all religious teachings—to have been found in violation of their
parole for attempting to protect their First Amendment rights (hereinafter
“heterodox prisoners” or “heterodox parolees”).
Instances of the problem Hazle experienced (hereinafter the
“heterodox parolee problem”), however, have not occurred everywhere.
Instead, they have occurred more frequently in those states and jurisdictions
without any statutory, administrative, or regulatory protections allowing
parolees to express philosophical dissent without adverse consequences as
compared to those states that have implemented such protections.16 This
Comment argues that these protections are becoming increasingly necessary
not only to protect heterodox parolees, but also to protect public budgets,
which are strained when parolees initiate costly litigation to vindicate their
civil rights. Though a handful of commentators suggest simply banning
religious non-profits from administering parole programs to solve the
heterodox parolee program,17 this Comment rejects such an approach as it
would achieve the first goal (protecting heterodox parolees) at the expense
of the second (protecting public budgets). Rather, this Comment argues that
an appropriate solution to the heterodox parolee problem must balance the
rights of parolees, on the one hand, with the monetary and administrative
interests of government apparatuses on the other.
Part I of this Comment provides background on several issues
underlying the heterodox parolee problem. First, it surveys the vigorous
scholarly debate on the constitutionality of outsourcing parole programs to
religiously and ideologically affiliated non-profits. This part demonstrates a
firm scholarly and judicial consensus finding that the practice is
unconstitutional where participation in such programs is compulsory.
Second, Part I examines the relevant cases, paying particular attention to
common features in judicial reasoning and decision-making. This part finds
THOUSANDS OF MEN AND WOMEN HAVE RECOVERED FROM ALCOHOLISM (4th ed. 2002). See
also CHARLES BUFE, ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS: CULT OR CURE? (2d ed. 1998). Narcotics
Anonymous, the largest drug-abuse recovery program in the United States, also uses the 12Step Program.
15
See generally Gallas, supra note 13.
16
See infra Part II for discussion of specific protections.
17
See, e.g., Susan Henderson-Utis, Comment, What Would the Founding Fathers Do?
The Rise of Religious Programs in the United States Prison System, 52 HOW. L. J. 459
(2009).
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that judges have vindicated parolees’ constitutional claims with remarkable
consistency, despite the fact that judges have uniformly declined to address
the constitutionality of using religious non-profits to administer parole
programs generally.
Part II examines the existing laws, rules, and regulations that govern
parole programs. By and large, this Comment finds that legislators,
bureaucrats, and other official decision makers fail to address the lack of
parole protections for heterodox parolees. The handful of protections that
do exist constitute a step in the right direction. But most are ambiguous or
circuitous, and therefore insufficient for a society that is becoming less
Christian and more likely to assert beliefs that conflict with the dominant
philosophy of non-profit parole programs.
Part III focuses on the construction of new legal protections for
heterodox parolees within the context of the country’s existing
rehabilitation infrastructure. After analyzing the costs and benefits to the
government agencies responsible for corrections and parole, this Comment
argues that the best solution to the heterodox parolee problem would not
involve—as other commentators have suggested—an outright ban on
religious parole programs. Instead, the solution would involve
implementing rules and regulations barring penalties for sincere objections
to religious parole programs. This Comment argues that existing laws (the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act18 and the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act19), regulations (Charitable Choice20), and
administrative rules (CDOC Memorandum Directive No. 08-0621) provide
strong guidance to this end. Existing laws protect prisoners’ sincerely held
religious beliefs and provide a framework enabling them to vindicate their
rights in court. Given the continuity of focus and wealth of case law,
implementing a modified version of the rights established by laws,
regulations, and administrative rules provides the best guide for legislative
action.

18

See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000cc-1 to -5 (2000).
19
See Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to bb-4 (1993).
20
See Charitable Choice Regulations Applicable to States Receiving Substance Abuse
Prevention and Treatment Block Grants and/or Projects for Assistance in Transition from
Homelessness Grants, 42 C.F.R. § 54 (2016).
21
See CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., MEMORANDUM DIRECTIVE NO. 08-06: PAROLEE
PARTICIPATION IN FAITH-BASED DRUG TREATMENT PROGRAMS (2008).
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I. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RELIGIOUSLY AFFILIATED PAROLE
PROGRAMS: SCHOLARSHIP AND CASE LAW
Although this Comment emphasizes practical concerns over theoretical
ones, the scholarly debate over the constitutionality of using religious nonprofits to administer parole programs, and how that debate accords with
case law, provides a useful context for thinking about solutions. To the
extent that commentators have addressed the topic, there is a clear
consensus that religious rehabilitation programs violate the First
Amendment’s Establishment Clause only when they are effectively
compulsory because no alternatives are available.22 A zealous minority,
however, has argued that the use of religious non-profits to administer
parole programs is unconstitutional even if alternatives are available.23
To the chagrin of commentators arguing for the strict
unconstitutionality of religious parole programs, no judge has decided the
question. However, when the narrower issue of an individual’s
constitutional rights has arisen, courts have consistently vindicated the
plaintiff’s position.24 As discussed above, Mr. Hazle filed suit under
42 U.S.C § 1983 claiming that his First Amendment rights had been
violated when he was returned to jail for 100 additional days for failing to
adequately participate in an in-patient drug rehabilitation program
administered by a religious non-profit as required for parole.25 However,
Hazle only appealed on the issue of damages because he had already won
summary judgment on the substance of his claim.26 The district court judge
awarded summary judgment on the substance of Hazle’s claim because
there was already a strong consensus that the First Amendment barred state
actors from compelling prisoners and parolees to attend religious
programs.27 This part discusses how this consensus has evolved.
Supreme Court cases on the Establishment Clause are generally

22
See, e.g., Derek P. Apanovitch, Religion and Rehabilitation: The Requisition of God
by the State, 47 DUKE L. J. 785 (1997); Rachel F. Calabro, Correction through Coercion: Do
State Mandated Alcohol and Drug Treatment Programs in Prisons Violate the Establishment
Clause?, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 565 (2004); Christopher M. Meissner, Prayer or Prison: The
Unconstitutionality of Mandatory Faith-Based Substance Abuse Treatment, 54 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 671 (2006); Michael G. Honeymar, Note, Alcoholics Anonymous as a Condition of
Drunk Driving Probation: When Does It Amount to Establishment of Religion?, 97 COLUM.
L. REV. 437 (1997); Gallas, supra note 13.
23
See, e.g., Henderson-Utis, supra note 17.
24
See infra notes 29–40 and accompanying discussion.
25
See Hazle v. Crofoot, 727 F.3d 983, 987–90 (9th Cir. 2013).
26
See id.
27
See id.
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organized into two categories.28 The first involves the government
attempting to “coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its
exercise.”29 Such cases arise when “the state is imposing religion on an
unwilling subject.”30 The Supreme Court has unequivocally held this type
of behavior unconstitutional.31 The second category of cases includes those
involving government actors and institutions behaving in a way that
benefits religions.32 At least until recently, the Lemon test has been the
preferred means of adjudicating these cases.33 The Lemon test evolved from
a challenge to the constitutionality of state laws providing aid to private
parochial schools. It requires, that to be constitutional, a law must (1) “have
a secular legislative purpose,” (2) “neither advance[] nor inhibit[] religion,”
and (3) “not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with
religion.’”34 Although some scholars have suggested that the Supreme
Court may be moving away from this test, it is still followed.35
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue directly, state
and lower federal courts unanimously classify cases involving religious
themed rehabilitation in the “coercion” category.36 The Seventh Circuit—
the first appellate court to adjudicate the issue—created the now dominant
test for evaluating prisoner and parolee First Amendment claims in Kerr v.
Farrey.37 In Kerr, an inmate sued a minimum-security prison in Wisconsin
that required those convicted of drug-related crimes to attend a
rehabilitation program or face removal to a higher security prison.38
Narcotics Anonymous (N.A.) was the program’s sole facilitator and thus
28

See Gallas, supra note 13 at 1078–79.
Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472, 477 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668, 678 (1984)).
30
Id.
31
See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (finding official school prayer
unconstitutional); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1962) (finding
school Bible reading unconstitutional); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961)
(finding unconstitutional a law that required public officials to affirm belief in the existence
of God).
32
Kerr, 95 F.3d at 477–78; see, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (finding
state law providing aid to private parochial schools unconstitutional); Everson v. Bd. of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (finding state law providing aid to private parochial schools
unconstitutional with respect to reimbursing public transportation costs of private parochial
school students).
33
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613–14 (1971).
34
Id. at 612–13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
35
See Honeymar, supra note 22.
36
See infra, notes 47–48.
37
See Kerr, 95 F.3d 472.
38
Id. at 474.
29
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the only option for the inmates required to participate.39 One such inmate,
James Kerr, objected to the consistent references to and invocations of God
in N.A.’s rehabilitation program and sued when his access to parole was
adversely affected.40 The district court analyzed Kerr’s First Amendment
claim, not as a claim that the state was coercing him to participate in a
religious exercise, but rather as essentially claiming that the state was acting
in a way that benefits religions. Thus, the district court applied the Lemon
test and, under that test, it ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of
the state.41
The Seventh Circuit, however, rejected the district court’s reliance on
Lemon and reversed its grant of summary judgment, as the Seventh Circuit
treated Kerr’s first claim as one alleging that the state was coercing him to
follow religion and not just acting in a way to benefit religion.42 Relying on
Supreme Court language from Lee v. Weisman,43 the court held that state
coercion claims beg three questions: “[F]irst, has the state acted; second,
does the action amount to coercion; and third, is the object of the coercion
religious or secular?”44 The court answered the first question affirmatively,
even though N.A. ran the program, because the prison required inmate
participation.45 In response to the second question, the court found that the
state had acted coercively by penalizing non-participation with removal to
higher security prisons even though Kerr himself was not removed.46
Finally, the court held that the coercion was religious because the program
was “based on the monotheistic idea of a single God or Supreme Being,”
despite N.A.’s insistence that their God concept could be interpreted
secularly.47
39

Id.
Id. at 475. Kerr was removed to a higher security prison for noncompliance with the
rehabilitation program. Id.
41
Id. at 476–79.
42
Id. at 479–80.
43
505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (The “government may not coerce anyone to support or
participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which ‘establishes a [state]
religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.’”).
44
Kerr, 95 F.3d at 479.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 479–80. The N.A. principles repeatedly reference “God, as we understood
Him.” Id. (quoting the twelve steps of the N.A. program). Although the district court
interpreted the second clause as compatible with secular concepts such as “willpower within
the individual,” the Seventh Circuit focused on the phrase’s inclusion of the word “Him.”
Id. at 480. It emphasized, “[e]ven if we expanded the steps to include polytheistic ideals, or
animistic philosophies, they are still fundamentally based on a religious concept of a Higher
Power.” Id.
40
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All federal appeals, district,48 and state supreme courts49 addressing
prisoners’ and parolees’ First Amendment rights have used the standard the
Seventh Circuit articulated in Kerr to reach the same conclusion on the
constitutional question.50 However, since all heterodox lawsuits name
public officials as defendants, the core constitutional issue is, in practice,
always linked to and contingent upon a determination of whether the
official has qualified immunity. On this question courts have meaningfully
evolved since Kerr.
The doctrine of qualified immunity provides government officials
found to have violated certain rights with immunity from civil damages
liability “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.”51 “Clearly established,” the operative phrase, serves as the primary
locus for debate. If the right the official violated was “clearly established”
at the time of the violation, then the official is not entitled to qualified
immunity.52 If, however, the right the official violated was not “clearly
established” at the time of the violation, then the official is entitled to
48

See, e.g., Turner v. Hickman, 342 F. Supp. 2d 887 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (finding
unconstitutional violation where atheist parolee was required to attend NA program);
Alexander v. Schenk, 118 F. Supp. 2d 298 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding compulsory
participation in an AA-based substance abuse program unconstitutional); Warburton v.
Underwood, 2 F. Supp. 2d 306 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding compulsory participation
unconstitutional with respect to a N.A. program); Nusbaum v. Terrangi, 210 F. Supp. 2d 784
(E.D. Va. 2002) (finding the conditioning of “good credits” on attending religious
programming unconstitutional); Ross v. Keelings, 2 F. Supp. 2d 810 (E.D. Va. 1998)
(finding unconstitutional a compulsory program emphasizing rehabilitation through
spirituality); Bausch v. Sumiec, 139 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (E.D. Wis. 2001) (denying summary
judgment on atheist parolee’s claim that he was unconstitutionally coerced to attend a AAbased rehabilitation program).
49
See, e.g., Griffin v. Coughlin, 673 N.E.2d 98 (N.Y. 1996) (finding requirement to
attend AA meetings to participate in family reunion program unconstitutional); Arnold v.
Tenn. Bd. of Paroles, 956 S.W.2d 478 (Tenn. 1997) (finding that inmate stated a claim
where he was denied parole for failure to participate in AA meetings).
50
See, e.g., Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537 (8th Cir. 2014) (finding that a Missouri
nonbeliever’s First Amendment rights had been violated when he was denied early parole
after withdrawing from a religious rehabilitation program necessary to receive it); Hazle v.
Crofood, 727 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding a California atheist’s First Amendment rights
had been violated when he was returned to prison for refusing to participate in religious
exercises during parole program); Inouye v. Kemna, 504 F.3d 705 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding
that a parole officer had violated a Buddhist parolee’s rights by compelling his participation
in a religious program despite his objections and request for a secular alternative); Warner v.
Orange Cnty. Dep’t of Prob., 115 F.3d 1068 (2d Cir. 1997), aff’d on reh’g, 173 F.3d 120 (2d
Cir. 1999) (finding required AA meetings unconstitutional).
51
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
52
Id.
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qualified immunity.53 The Supreme Court has clarified that this question
must be answered from the perspective of a reasonable public official in the
defendant’s position.54
Because precedent was sparse at the time Kerr was decided, the
Seventh Circuit ultimately found the rights were not “clearly established,”
and thus, the officials were immune.55 Although the broader coercion
question was abundantly clear, it had not been answered in a relevant
context so case law could not be considered “clearly established.”56 By
2007, however, other courts were becoming less forgiving.57 In Inouye v.
Kemna, the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court’s grant of qualified
immunity to a Hawaiian parole officer emphasizing that case law was
almost entirely consistent and that the limited exceptions in existence were
either distinguishable or had been abrogated by higher courts.58 All
appellate cases since Inouye have denied qualified immunity on the First
Amendment question.59
II. EXISTING LAWS, RULES, AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING PAROLE
PROGRAMS & PAROLEE RIGHTS
This part focuses on existing legal instruments that affect the
constitutional rights of heterodox parolees. Subpart A discusses protections
that have been implemented at the state level, most notably by DOCs and
administrative agencies in California and Illinois. Subpart B examines
actions taken at the federal level, such as the Charitable Choice regulations
and executive orders controlling the distribution of money under the FaithBased Initiatives Program. This Comment ultimately argues that many of
the legal instruments discussed in this part provide strong models for
additional public actions that can resolve the heterodox parolee problem
more comprehensively.
A. STATE GOVERNMENTS

Despite being thoroughly rebuked by courts, states have been wary to
53

Id.
See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987); see also Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S.
603, 617 (1999) (finding that case law may be “clearly established” even without an absolute
legal consensus).
55
See Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472, 480–81 (7th Cir. 1996).
56
See id.
57
See Inouye v. Kemna, 504 F.3d 705 (9th Cir. 2007).
58
See id. at 715–16.
59
See, e.g., Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537 (8th Cir. 2014); Hazle v. Crofood, 727 F.3d
983 (9th Cir. 2013).
54

4. GRUDZINA

2016]

3/2/2017 3:39 PM

SECULAR DISSENT

575

limit their reliance on religious rehabilitation organizations. So far,
California is the only state that reacted to First Amendment parolee lawsuits
by formally adopting written policies to prevent future civil rights abuses.60
In fact, it did so twice.61
The first time California reacted to a First Amendment parolee lawsuit
was in response to the 1994 case, O’Connor v. California.62 The heterodox
plaintiff in that case had been convicted of driving while intoxicated and
was required to participate in an outpatient alcoholism treatment program.63
Although CDOC had approved a secular alcoholism program in his area, it
was not included on the list of options the corrections officials gave him
when he reported for referrals.64 This had the effect of limiting him to AA
or other religious programs.65 After signing up for one, the heterodox
plaintiff took exception to its religious content and filed suit on First
Amendment grounds in the U.S. District Court for California’s Central
District.66 The district court ultimately held the plaintiff’s First Amendment
rights were not violated because there was a secular alternative to the
religious program in the area.67
Even though the district court denied the plaintiff’s claim, the state of
California took action to protect other heterodox parolees. The state
amended California Administrative Code § 9860, which is a regulation
issued by the California Department of Alcohol and Drug Programs that
deals with the menu of programming options for parolees sentenced to
alcohol treatment. The version of the regulation in effect at the time the
plaintiff in O’Connor filed suit simply stated that corrections officers within
each county “shall ensure that a variety of options are available which take
into account the unique needs of each participant.”68 This language did not
immediately call attention to parolees’ religious beliefs or lack thereof.
However, as a result of the O’Connor case, California amended the
regulation to more clearly address parolees’ religious beliefs or lack thereof.
The amended provision, which came into effect in 1995, addresses this
issue in two ways. First, it classifies AA and other 12-Step programs as
60

See infra notes 62–67 and accompanying discussion.
See infra notes 72–75 and accompanying discussion.
62
855 F. Supp. 303 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
63
See id. at 304.
64
See id. at 305.
65
See id.
66
See id. at 304–05.
67
See id. at 307–08.
68
See Honeymar, supra note 22, at 468 (emphasis added) (quoting the 1992 version of
the provision).
61
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sectarian organizations and then requires counties using such organization
to also list available “non-sectarian organizations.”69 Second, and more
importantly, it compels counties to approve a non-sectarian organization if:
(1) it has only certified sectarian organizations, or (2) the only available
non-sectarian organizations are not accessible to the parolee.70 The second
prong of the amended regulation is particularly remarkable in that is goes
farther than any other piece of law by requiring that the non-sectarian
parolee programs be “accessible” to the parolee, unlike the previous version
of the regulation, which only required that alternative options be made
“available.” “Accessibility” is a stricter concept than availability, and thus
effectively provides more protection for heterodox parolees.71
The second time California took legislative action as a result of a
heterodox parolee lawsuit ultimately resulted from a gap in the protection
provided by the amended § 9860. The amended regulation operated in
relatively small space: it only dealt with outpatient self-help alcohol
treatment programs.72 As a consequence, the regulation did not eliminate
the possibility of constitutional rights being infringed upon in other areas of
the parole system, such as narcotics and inpatient programs. Barry Hazle,
ordered to attend a drug treatment program, fell into this gap about a decade
later. This eventually led to California passing its second initiative to
address the rights of heterodox parolees.
In November 2008, more than a year after Hazle filed suit, CDOC
issued new instructions that barred parole officers from penalizing parolees
who refuse to participate in religious or faith-based programs because of
their beliefs.73 With the Ninth Circuit’s 2007 holding in Inouye in mind,
CDOC spoke unequivocally: “Effective immediately, Parole Agents
assigned to the [Division of Adult Parole Operations], shall not require a
parolee attend AA, NA, or any other religious based program if the parolee
refused to participate in such a program for religious reasons.”74 Most
importantly, the directive stipulated that if a parolee refused to participate
on religious grounds, “the parolee shall be referred to an alternative
nonreligious program.”75 Although the directive failed to protect Hazle, it
seems to have prevented similar lawsuits since.
To this extent, the directive seems to have been successful, but it has
69
70
71
72
73
74
75

Id. at 468 & 468 nn.142–44 (quoting the 1995 version of the provision).
See id. at 468 & 468 n.145.
See id. at 466, 471.
See id. at 471–72.
See CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., supra note 21.
Id.
Id.
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potential conflicts with CDOC rules governing parolee program placement.
Specifically, the CDOC operations manual calls for parolees to be placed in
rehabilitation programs based in the same county in which they were
incarcerated.76 There are several exceptions allowing parolees to be placed
in other counties, but a lack of secular programs is not among them.77
Although it may be that the official policy under the operations manual is
practically to provide for an exception in the case of secular programs as
well,78 the best practice would be to formally incorporate the directive into
the operations manual.
This confusion aside, CDOC has the most robust protections for
heterodox parolees in the country. Its strength is especially clear when
contrasted with the protections (or lack thereof) in other states. Illinois is
the only other state with protections on the books in the rehabilitation
context.79 The Illinois Department of Human Services (IDHS) is
responsible for licensing rehabilitative facilities in the state.80 IDHS’s
licensing requirements stipulate that all types of facilities must provide
patients with a list of their rights.81 The list must include statements
conveying that: “access to services will not be denied on the basis of race,
religion, ethnicity, disability, sexual orientation or HIV status,” and “the
right to refuse treatment or any specific treatment procedure and a right to
be informed of the consequences resulting from such refusal.”82 Although
heterodox parolees could argue that a failure to place them in a nonreligious program constitutes a denial to services on the basis of religion,
the argument is tenuous in light of how challenges under this licensing
requirement are brought in reality. The vast majority of religious objections
handled by state and federal courts are made by individuals that adhere to
specific religious creeds, not individuals that reject such belief systems.83
Furthermore, state corrections officers, like judges, are generally more
suspicious of the motives of heterodox individuals who, like adherents of
obscure religions, have a hard time establishing the sincerity of their
convictions.84 This probably means that Illinois parolees would have to
76

See CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., OPERATIONS MANUAL §§ 81010.1–.2 (2005).
See id. § 81010.2.
78
The relevant policy statement suggests that “[a]n inmate may be paroled to another
county if it would be in the best interest of the public and of the parolee.” Id. (emphasis
added).
79
Patient Rights, ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 77, § 2060.323 (2003).
80
Id. § 2060.323(a)
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
See supra notes 48–51.
84
See infra notes 162–163 and accompanying discussion of relevant cases.
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resort to filing a lawsuit to vindicate their constitutional rights, like parolees
in other states.
B. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

The federal government’s involvement with parole and rehabilitation
systems is principally shaped by its Charitable Choice regulations.85
Charitable Choice was created by the Welfare Reform Act of 1996.86 In
2000, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services expanded it to
cover substance abuse treatment providers.87 Charitable Choice makes
religious organizations eligible for federal funding without having to
“secularize” as long as they comply with a number of provisions designed
to ensure they do not violate the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses
of the First Amendment.88 Broadly speaking, religious organizations
comply with these provisions when they do not “discriminate against a
program beneficiary or prospective program beneficiary on the basis of
religion or religious belief.”89 But as the provision has never been
adjudicated, it is unclear what discrimination means in this context.
Similarly, Charitable Choice bans organizations from using federal money
to engage in “sectarian worship, instruction, or proselytization.”90 As the
operative term—”sectarian”—is undefined, it is unclear whether this would
prevent, for example, a non-denominational Christian prayer as well as a
denominational one.91
Notwithstanding this lingering confusion, Charitable Choice’s most
notable feature is unambiguous. Similar to the aforementioned Illinois
regulations,92 Charitable Choice gives program participants the right to
object to any treatment.93 But it goes further. First, it makes clear that this
85

See 42 C.F.R. § 54 (2016).
See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104–193, 110 Stat. 2105 (2016).
87
See 42 C.F.R. § 54.1 (2000).
88
42 U.S.C. § 290kk–1(b), (c)(1) (2000) (“The purpose of this section is to allow
religious organizations to be program participants on the same basis as any other nonprofit
private provider without impairing the religious character of such organizations, and without
diminishing the religious freedom of program beneficiaries.”). Previously, organizations
would have to eliminate all traces of religion from their services and charters, and refrain
from taking religion into account in hiring decisions to be eligible to receive federal funding.
See Meissner, supra note 22, at 692.
89
42 U.S.C. § 290kk–1(f)(4) (2000).
90
Id. § 290kk–2 (emphasis added).
91
See Meissner, supra note 22, at 692–93.
92
See supra note 28 and related discussion.
93
See 42 C.F.R. § 54.8(a) (2003).
86
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objection may simply derive from the program’s “religious character.”94
Second, when the objection is registered, the program administrators must
refer the participant to the controlling governmental body.95 The controlling
government body is then obligated to give the participant access to an
acceptable “alternative provider” whose services are of at least equal
rehabilitative value.96
Although this protection seems to substantially resolve the heterodox
parolee problem, its effectiveness is undermined in two ways. First,
Charitable Choice regulations only apply to organizations that accept
federal money on its terms.97 As a vast number of private rehabilitation
programs do not accept federal money,98 many are simply not obligated to
respect their patients’ ideological objections or refer the participants to
government officials for alternative treatment. Second, nothing prevents
religious programs from working directly with DOCs and drug courts. In
fact, 12-Step programs often take this approach with the strategic end of
preserving their “sectarian” approach to rehabilitation.99 Given their low
overhead costs, state resources and referrals are more than enough for such
programs to prosper. The existence of Charitable Choice’s protection gap
has abetted and continues to abet the abuse of heterodox parolees’
constitutional rights.100
In addition to Charitable Choice, another area where the federal
government has gotten involved in the heterodox parolee problem is in
regard to Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) regulations. Although the
federal protections against religious rehabilitation programs are easily
avoided, the BOP has a record of quickly rolling back other problematic
regulations that have been challenged.101 Shortly after entering the White
House, President George W. Bush issued an executive order designed to
increase aid to religious charities.102 Among other things, this expanded the
use and capabilities of religious non-profits working in federal prisons.103 In
Iowa, for example, an evangelical Christian non-profit called Inner Change
94

42 U.S.C. § 290kk–1(f)(1).
See id.
96
Id. § 290kk–1(f)(1)(A)–(B).
97
See 42 C.F.R. § 54.1.
98
See Gallas, supra note 13.
99
See Meissner, supra note 22, at 675 n.31 (providing examples of “stealth
evangelism”).
100
See id. (arguing that Charitable Choice regulations must be made applicable to all
treatment centers that accept offenders from any court across the country).
101
See infra note 107 and accompanying discussion.
102
See Exec. Order No. 13,199, 66 Fed. Reg. 8499 (Jan. 29, 2001).
103
See id.
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began offering rehabilitation programs that required prisoners to submit
applications.104 Admittance was contingent on prisoners’ agreement to use
and study the Bible105 and those that enrolled received perks like free tshirts and books, less supervision by prison staff, streaming radio, and
increased phone access.106 Shortly after its implementation, a secularist
group sued on behalf of affected Iowa prisoners alleging that the DOC was
unconstitutionally discriminating against non-Christians by retaining Inner
Change, which was rewarding participants and attempting to indoctrinate
those that did not.107 Within weeks of the district court’s ruling that found
the program in violation of the First Amendment under the Lemon test, the
BOP eliminated Inner Change programming in Iowa.108
The BOP’s rapid response to the district court decision, which took
place while the decision was docketed for appeal,109 was not a signal of
broader policy change within the BOP. The BOP continued using religious
non-profits like Inner Change in other facilities without providing
alternative or equivalent programming for heterodox prisoners and parolees,
or otherwise implementing rules to protect their rights.110 Given abundant
scholarly criticism of Bush’s faith-based initiatives111 and unequivocal
rejection of funded programs in court,112 this inaction suggests an
insufficient level of respect for taxpayer resources and constitutional rights.
Fortunately, however, the problem can be rectified without negating the
financial benefits of using religious non-profits to administer rehabilitation

104

See Ams. United for Separation of Church & State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries,
432 F. Supp. 2d 862, 871 (S.D. Iowa 2006). Inner Change was also active in prisons in
Texas, Minnesota, Kansas, Tennessee, Arkansas, and Missouri. The Iowa DOC had hoped to
set up their own rehabilitation program “without the overtly religious instruction included in
Inner Change,” but found that doing so was cost prohibitive and solicited the organization
for programming administration. Id. at 881.
105
See Nathaniel Odle, Privilege Through Prayer: Examining Bible-Based Prison
Rehabilitation Programs Under the Establishment Clause, 12 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 277, 278
(2007).
106
See Ams. United, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 901.
107
Id. at 865.
108
Morning Edition: Bible-Based Prison Treatment Program Shelved, NATIONAL
PUBLIC RADIO (June 7, 2006), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=
5456293.
109
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s constitutional holdings, but reversed
its order for Inner Change to repay the fees it had accepted. See Ams. United for Separation
of Church & State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, Inc., 509 F.3d 406 (8th Cir. 2007).
110
See, e.g., Scott M. Michelman, Faith-Based Initiatives, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 475
(2002).
111
See id. at 476–78.
112
See supra notes 31–34 and accompanying text.
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programing.
III. CONSTRUCTING NEW RIGHTS AND PROTECTIONS
This part discusses ways of protecting the constitutional rights of
heterodox prisoners and parolees in court-ordered rehabilitation programs.
It prefers solutions that seek to prevent violations from arising in the first
place over solutions that merely improve the ability of injured parties to
vindicate their rights in court.
Subpart A argues that the most comprehensive way of protecting
constitutional rights requires the continued use of religious service
providers as part of each DOC’s “menu” of rehabilitative programming.
The next two subparts discuss specific solutions to the heterodox parolee
problem that can be implemented while still using religious rehabilitative
programs. Subpart B focuses on statutory solutions, and argues that there is
precedent for congressional action involving the religious rights of
prisoners and parolees and that existing legislation provides a proven model
for new law tailored to heterodox individuals. Finally, Subpart C focuses on
non-statutory solutions as it discusses the role of DOCs and other public
administrative entities involved in the administration of prison and parole.
This Comment argues that their close proximity to and direct authority over
prisoners and parolees gives them the best opportunity to prevent abuse
proactively.
A. COSTS AND BENEFITS: RELIGIOUS CONTRACTORS ARE
SUCCESSFUL AND NECESSARY, AS WELL AS CONSTITUTIONAL

The success of rehabilitation programs is typically measured by
examining their effects on recidivism rates: if program participants have a
lower recidivism rate than the general inmate population, then the program
is generally considered successful.113 However, although these low
recidivism rates may indicate the programs are successful, they do not
indicate that the programs are cost effective. In order for these programs to
be cost effective, the savings from not having to re-incarcerate or discipline
inmates must outweigh the overhead costs of administering the program,
which are often considerable. This subpart examines religious and secular
rehabilitation programs with these considerations in mind. Taking into
account the additional factor of program availability, this Comment argues
that the costs and logistics of phasing out religious contractors altogether
113

See Kimberly L. Patch, The Sentencing Reform Act: Reconsidering Rehabilitation as
a Critical Consideration in Sentencing, 39 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 165,
190–91 (2013).
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create an insurmountable barrier for cash-strapped state DOCs.
It would be difficult to overstate the deleterious consequences
recidivism has on the administration of prisons and parole. On average,
approximately 28% of inmates released from prison in 2005 were rearrested
for a new crime within six months.114 This figure climbed to 43% within
one year of release, 67% within three years, before finally peaking at 76%
within five years.115 Moreover, when the sample of released inmates is
limited to those originally convicted for drug-related offenses, the
recidivism rate increases even more dramatically.116
From the perspective of prosecutors and sentencing judges, recidivism
is perhaps the most important factor used in determining the costs and
benefits of different sentencing options.117 In 2010, for example, the
Missouri Sentencing Advisory Commission118 developed a framework,
Automated Recommended Sentencing, to encourage judges to consider the
costs of sentencing options in light of their predicted recidivism rates.119
Based on the nature of a convict’s crime and criminal history, the
sentencing judge is presented with several sentencing options with their
respective costs to the state budget.120 Critically, the costs of a given
sentence are listed alongside the historical recidivism rates associated with
it.121 For example, a sentence of five years probation with enhanced
supervision has an expected total cost of $8,960.122 If, on the other hand, the
judge opts for normal supervision over the same timeframe, the total
114

Prisoner Recidivism Analysis Tool: 2005, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. (Feb. 4, 2016),
http://www.bjs.gov/recidivism_2005_arrest/# (select the “Analysis” tab and then the
“Cumulative Percentages” button). These statistics are derived from data the Department of
Justice aggregated from thirty state DOCs.
115
Id.
116
Id.; see also MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., RECIDIVISM OF
PRISONERS RELEASED IN 30 STATES IN 2005: PATTERNS FROM 2005 TO 2010 at 8 (2014)
(finding that those originally convicted of drug offenses are the second most likely category
of criminals to be rearrested within any of the tracked timeframes, after those convicted of
property offenses).
117
See Lynn S. Branham, Follow the Leader: The Advisability and Propriety of
Considering Cost and Recidivism Data at Sentencing, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 169, 169–70
(2012).
118
The Missouri Sentencing Advisory Commission is a public research entity that
works alongside Missouri’s DOC and Board of Probation and Parole. See About Us, MO.
SENT’G ADVISORY COMMISSION, http://www.mosac.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=45464 (last visited
Sept. 24, 2016).
119
See Michael A. Wolff, Missouri Provides Cost of Sentences and Recidivism Data:
What Does Cost Have to Do with Justice?, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 161, 161 (2012).
120
See id. at 162.
121
Id.
122
Id.
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expected cost is reduced to $6,770.123 In this case, however, the respective
recidivism rates of the sentencing options—both exactly 29.7%—would
encourage the judge to opt for the cheaper, yet equally effective option.124
Missouri’s Automated Recommended Sentencing system was the first of its
kind and is by no means common.125 The impetus behind it and its generally
favorable reception amongst legal experts suggest that recidivism statistics
may start to play a larger role in individual sentencing decisions.126
Ultimately, however, Missouri’s Automated Recommended
Sentencing framework is crude and potentially misleading because of its
failure to factor long-term costs avoided by rehabilitative sentencing
options. As of now, no state DOC, legislature, or administrative agency has
sought to scientifically incorporate rehabilitation data into sentencing
decisions.127 Given the dramatic beneficial effects rehabilitation programs
have on reducing recidivism rates, this is unfortunate.
Alcohol and substance abuse programs are administered to parolees
either on an outpatient or inpatient basis. A large majority of both program
types use a version of the 12-Step model.128 From states’ perspectives,
referring parolees to such religious-oriented programs is desirable because
they are typically cheap, their prices driven down by heavy reliance on
volunteer labor and member donations.129 Many programs, especially of the
outpatient variety, are altogether free.130 But when statewide DOC costs are
analyzed, research clearly indicates that both varieties come with significant
average costs in raw dollars and cents.131 In California, for example, a
2000–2001 study of substance treatment centers revealed that the average
costs of out- and inpatient treatment for one parolee were $1,505 and
$6,745 respectively.132 This data is in line with an analogous study
conducted in the state ten years earlier.133
Rehabilitative programs’ price tags, although significant, are largely
justified by the two beneficial effects they have on systemic costs. First,
123

Id.
See id. at 162–63.
125
See Branham, supra note 117, at 169.
126
See id. at 169–71.
127
See Wolff, supra note 119, at 163.
128
STANTON PEELE ET AL., RESISTING 12-STEP COERCION: HOW TO FIGHT FORCED
PARTICIPATION IN AA, NA, OR 12-STEP TREATMENT, 22 (2000).
129
See Gallas supra note 22, at 1096–99.
130
See id. at 6.
131
Susan L. Ettner et al., Benefit–Cost in the California Treatment Outcome Project:
Does Substance Abuse Treatment “Pay for Itself”?, 41 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 192 (2006).
132
See id. at 202.
133
See id. at 194–95 (discussing and analyzing the previous study).
124
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outpatient and inpatient treatment programs tend to pay for themselves in
absolute dollars by reducing the amount of money individuals and
institutions have to pay for future medical care associated with substance
abuse.134 When upfront program costs are compared to the predicted
medical costs associated with untreated drug addicts and alcoholics, the
estimated costs-benefits ratios are quite favorable: for every dollar spent on
rehabilitation programs, the state can expect to save (by not having to
spend) between six and eleven dollars.135 Second, both outpatient and
inpatient programs tend to lower recidivism rates relative to the general
inmate population by a significant margin. In Delaware, for example,
parolees who completed an inpatient rehabilitation program were 11% less
likely than the state’s general inmate population to engage in additional
criminal activity.136 When parolees completing the inpatient program were
allowed to participate in an additional outpatient treatment program before
release, they had a 31% lower recidivism rate than the general inmate
population.137 This data has been borne out by subsequent studies
examining other prison populations in Delaware138 and other states.139
Although these statistics speak volumes about the relative success of
parolee treatments programs generally, they do not tell us much about
sectarian programs directly. An unambiguous statistical consensus
regarding another factor in the rehabilitation process, however, amply
fulfills this role: ideological commitment. When parolees’ beliefs and
convictions comport with the ethos of the rehabilitation programs they
attend, the likelihood that they will be incarcerated again declines.140 This
134

See id.
See id. at 201–02.
136
Steven S. Martin et al., Three-Year Outcomes of Therapeutic Community Treatment
for Drug-Involved Offenders in Delaware: From Prison to Work Release to Aftercare, 79
PRISON J. 294, 305–07 (1999).
137
See id. at 307.
138
See, e.g., James A. Inciardi et al., Five-Year Outcomes of Therapeutic Community
Treatment of Drug-Involved Offenders After Release from Prison, 50 CRIME & DELINQ. 88,
97–101 (2004).
139
See, e.g., Michael L. Prendergast et al., Amity Prison-Based Therapeutic Community:
5-Year Outcomes, 84 PRISON J. 36, 48–50 (2004) (finding roughly the same difference in
recidivism probability between the groups within five years of their release); Harry K.
Wexler et al., Three-Year Reincarceration Outcomes for Amity In-Prison Therapeutic
Community and Aftercare in California, 79 PRISON J. 321 (1999) (finding that inmates who
completed a drug rehabilitation were roughly 40% less likely than non-participants and
program dropouts to be reincarcerated within three years of their release).
140
See SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN., DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., TREATMENT IMPROVEMENT PROTOCOL SERIES 35: ENHANCING MOTIVATION
FOR CHANGE IN SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT xv (1999) (“[L]ongitudinal research
135
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simple, almost intuitive concept has been repeatedly borne out by
research.141 Specifically, when parolees participating in religious
rehabilitation programs like AA already value religion upon entering the
program, the likelihood that they will complete the program and avoid
future criminal activity increases.142 This should not be taken as evidence
for the proposition that the religious features of AA and other similar
programs drive lower recidivism rates. Although, on the one hand, it
highlights the fact that recidivism declines when the philosophical ethos of
rehabilitation programs matches the preexisting beliefs and values of their
patients;143 on the other hand, it suggests that recidivism may increase (or,
at least, decrease by a smaller rate) when there is discontinuity between
program ethos and patient beliefs and values.144
Considering this effect associated with the religious nature of
rehabilitative programs, there is reason to believe that the average
effectiveness of parolee rehabilitation would decline if religious programs
were declared categorically unconstitutional as there is a high
representation of Christians and other theists in jails and prisons. Without
any personal or emotional connection to secular programs, religious
parolees would be less engaged with the rehabilitation process and thus
more likely to violate their parole or eventually commit another substancerelated offense. This insight, when placed alongside the efficacy of religious
rehabilitation programs generally, provides a strong public policy
justification for allowing DOCs to continue to use such programs, in
addition to the fact that the practice is constitutionally defensible.145
Nevertheless, the best strategy, according to rehabilitation experts, is
for each DOC to develop a “menu” of rehabilitation programs “that are
responsive to client’s needs, preferences, and cultural background.”146 But
little evidence suggests that there are sufficient secular program providers in
each state to satisfy the demand for parole rehabilitation. There are only a
suggest[s] that an individual’s level of motivation is a very strong predictor of whether the
individual’s substance use will change or remain the same.”).
141
See, e.g., Jane Witbrodt et al., Do 12-Step MATO Over 9 years Predict Abstinence?,
43 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 30, 34–38 (2012).
142
See, e.g., James D. Griffith et al., A Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of In-Prison
Therapeutic Community Treatment and Risk Classification, 79 PRISON J. 352, 360–62
(1999).
143
See Witbrodt et al., supra note 141, at 36–38.
144
See id.
145
See supra Part I.
146
Keith Humphreys et al., Self-Help Organizations for Alcohol and Drug Problems:
Toward Evidence-Based Practice and Policy, 26 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 151, 151
(2004).
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handful of national secular program providers: SMART Recovery, Rational
Recovery, Women For Sobriety, and Secular Organizations for Sobriety
(SOS). Collectively, these organizations provide some degree of coverage
for each state in the U.S.147 This coverage, however, lacks depth. The total
number of in-person programs is in the hundreds, not thousands.148 On the
other hand, there are tens-of-thousands of religious programs, providing
virtually universal on-demand access to rehabilitation services to prisoners
and parolees. Moreover, the secular organizations primarily provide
outpatient group therapy run by volunteers, not the more intensive inpatient
treatment run by specialists.
A flat constitutional bar on religious programs would eliminate the use
of religious contractors for both inpatient and outpatient programs, so even
if secular groups could sustain the demand for outpatient programs, they
could not for inpatient programs. DOCs could, of course, attempt to
subsidize the requisite groups to meet their demands. But this would
involve expending indeterminable amounts of their already limited
resources. Moreover, in light of the well-established importance of ensuring
philosophical continuity between programs and their patients, there is little
incentive to risk upsetting the rehabilitation infrastructure when the
constitutional impetus for doing so is so thin. There is little evidence
suggesting that this same philosophical continuity could not be preserved
for heterodox parolees by emphasizing shared beliefs and values unrelated
to religion. But available data make clear that religion is one of the largest
and most important options on the “menu” of rehabilitation
programming.149
B. STATUTORY SOLUTIONS: LESSONS FROM RLUIPA AND RFRA

Since the prospects are slim for widespread state-by-state action to
mitigate the threat to heterodox prisoners and parolees, some form of
federal action is desirable. Congress intervened twice on behalf of the First
Amendment rights of prisoners and parolees. In 1993, Congress passed the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).150 The RFRA barred state and
federal governments from imposing a “substantial burden” on one’s
“sincerely held religious beliefs” unless they pass a strict scrutiny test.151
This requires the government to demonstrate that the restriction is the “least
147
148
149
150

See Gallas, supra note 22, at 1098.
See id.
See Humphreys et al., supra note 146.
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb to bb-4

(1994).
151

Id.
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restrictive means” of “achieving a compelling government interest.”152 In
1997, the Supreme Court ruled the RFRA unconstitutional as it applied to
the states.153
Although the federal government remained bound by RFRA, the ruling
left states uncovered until 2000 when Congress passed the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).154 RLUIPA, which was
passed to rectify the RFRA’s constitutional problems, bars state and federal
prisons from engaging in the same burdensome behavior and subjects them
to strict scrutiny when they do so.155 Since the Supreme Court upheld the
RLUIPA’s constitutionality in 2005,156 it has become the preeminent tool
for religious minorities to protect their religious traditions within prisons
and jails, and has been praised by both religious and civil liberties
advocates.157 This subpart argues that there are compelling justifications for
congressional action in the area of parolee rights and that RLUIPA provides
an attractive model for such action.
As discussed, prisoners and parolees who were penalized for objecting
to compulsory participation in religious rehabilitation programs have
brought constitutional claims in roughly a dozen states.158 Despite the near
uniform success in court of these prisoner and parolee lawsuits, California
is the only state to have independently altered its correctional policies to
prevent future First Amendment violations.159 It is true that the problem of
penalizing these heterodox parolees is not particularly old—the first lawsuit
was brought in the mid-1990s. But the fact that most of the significant
cases—and most of the cases generally—occurred ten or more years ago,
suggests that states had a reasonable opportunity to respond, failed to do so,
and may continue to be unresponsive. This vacuum of state action provides
Congress with ample cause to act. Indeed, there is precedent for intervening
in this arena: its decision to enact RFRA and later RLUIPA was motivated
by nearly identical concerns.160
152

Id.
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
154
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000).
155
Id.
156
See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
157
See Derek L. Gaubatz, RLUIPA At Four: Evaluating the Success and
Constitutionality of RLUIPA’s Prisoner Provisions, 28 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 501, 506–
11 (2004).
158
See supra notes 32–33, 48–50.
159
See supra Part II.A.
160
See Gaubatz, supra note 157, at 511 (describing how one of Congress’s primary
motives for passing RLUIPA was its concern “that most states were unlikely to implement
their own laws promoting the free exercise rights of prisoners”).
153
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Each piece of RLUIPA’s substantial burden test is applicable, indeed
conducive, to the heterodox parolee context. Although RLUIPA does not
define “substantial burden,” it incorporated the term’s well-established
judicial meaning set forth by the Supreme Court.161 According to the Court,
an individual is substantially burdened when she is forced to “choose
between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on
the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion . . . on the
other.”162 More recently, the Court simplified its position and thereby
broadened the concept, emphasizing that a “tendency to coerce individuals
into acting contrary to their religious beliefs” constitutes a substantial
burden.163 Shrewdly summarizing the relevant body of case law, attorney
Derek Gaubatz noted that substantial burdens often manifest in one of two
forms: they either “(1) put[] pressure on individuals to modify their
religious behavior or (2) prevent[] them from engaging in religious conduct,
in a way that is greater than a mere inconvenience.”164 Significantly,
RLUIPA’s broad definition of “religious exercise” helps distinguish what is
“significant,” on the one hand, from what is “mere[ly] inconvenien[t],” on
the other.165 The RLUIPA protects “any exercise of religion, whether or not
compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”166 This casts a
broad net and, to a large extent, eliminates the theological hair-splitting
judges have a history of engaging in.167 Thus, the concept of “substantial
burden” provides an attractive model for legislation protecting the
constitutional rights of heterodox parolees.
Since the term is defined by abundant and well-established case law,
the primary task would simply involve recasting it, so as to protect
individuals who do not profess any religious beliefs. Because most of its
existing formulations could almost accomplish this task already, this should
not pose a complex interpretive problem. But to minimize confusion,
Congress must, at minimum, provide clear instructions that foreclose the
possibility of absurd interpretations.168 Factual similarities between all
161

See id. at 515.
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
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Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 450 (1988).
164
See Gaubatz, supra note 157, at 517.
165
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2000).
166
Id.
167
See Gaubatz, supra note 157, at 518–19 (discussing how the RFRA’s lack of an
analogous definition allowed judges to stymie its intent by requiring that beliefs be central to
an inmate’s religion to warrant protection).
168
Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV.
405, 431–32 (1989).
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heterodox parolee cases to date169 strongly suggest that a slightly modified
version of the first prong of Gaubatz’s “substantial burden” definition can
serve as the foundation for new law. Accordingly, such parolees are
“substantially burdened” when they are pressured to engage in a religious
exercise that they would otherwise avoid because of their general absence
or rejection of religious belief.170
The remaining elements of RLUIPA’s religious exercise protection
can be imported into the heterodox parolee context with more ease. First,
the requirement that religious beliefs be “sincerely held” to merit protection
is almost always perfunctory.171 It originated to prevent members of
religions that “are obviously shams” from cynically bringing First
Amendment claims.172 As of now, no judge has questioned the sincerity of
heterodox parolees attempting to vindicate their constitutional rights.173 And
despite the relative absurdity of many specific claims made under RLUIPA,
they rarely do with respect to religious claimants.174
Second, strict scrutiny can be implemented, without modification, in
the heterodox parolee context. Under RLUIPA, once plaintiffs demonstrate
a substantial burden on their sincerely held religious beliefs, the
government bears the burden of passing strict scrutiny.175 This consists of
demonstrating that the burden it has imposed “further[s] a compelling
169

Specifically, all relevant cases involve the parolee being pressured to engage in
certain religious activities—which modifies their behavior insofar as they previously did not
engage in religious exercise—not being prevented from engaging activities their lack of
religious belief demands of them. See supra Part I.
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See, e.g., Jova v. Smith, 582 F.3d 410 (2d Cir. 2009) (accepting inmate’s claim that
his Tulukeesh religion was substantially burdened by prison’s refusal to serve him nonsoybean-based vegan diet); Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 2008) (accepting
inmate’s claims that his Ordo Templi Orientis religion was substantially burdened by
prison’s refusal to serve him a kosher diet); Shabazz v. Johnson, No. 3:12CV282, 2015 WL
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government interest,” by the “least restrictive means” possible.176 Both of
these concepts are “terms of art” with clearly delineated parameters.177
Under RLUIPA, courts have recognized relatively few government interests
as compelling.178 Security and orderly administration of prison rules are
most widely accepted, but cost and labor sustainability has been
successfully proffered on several occasions.179 One could easily envision a
state DOC claiming that providing parolees access to secular rehabilitation
programs would be cost prohibitive, especially given the more limited
availability of secular inpatient facilities. Standing alone, this argument
might carry substantial weight in certain states that have very low demand
for secular programming and DOC budgets. But given the operation of the
“least restrictive means” element, it is unlikely to be successful. If the
circumstances suggest that the government could protect its proffered
compelling interest by any other means, then it will fail the test.180 This
imposes a high evidentiary burden on the government in the context of a
relatively simple demand for non-religious rehabilitation alternatives. At
best, a government entity might be able to establish least restrictive means
where it already provides some secular alternatives with limited programing
options. In this situation, a parolee ordered to complete outpatient treatment
might find it logistically onerous to, for example, maintain a job while
traveling to meeting locations (leading to an accessibility problem).181 But it
is difficult, if not impossible, to construct a situation where the application
of strict scrutiny in the heterodox parolees context would enable
government institutions to sidestep its First Amendment responsibilities
altogether (and thereby get away with not making any secular programs
available).
Finally, RLUIPA requires plaintiffs to “exhaust[] any available
administrative remedies” before bringing a claim thereunder.182 This
provision is critical to minimize litigation under the proposed RLUIPA. But
176
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§ 2000cc(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2015).
177
See Gaubatz, supra note 157, at 539–40 (discussing key case law).
178
See id.
179
See, e.g., Baranowski v. Hart, 486 F.3d 112 (5th Cir. 2007); Muhammad v. Sapp,
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181
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programming availability amounts to “de facto” compulsion of religious activity).
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§ 1997e(a) (2000).
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requiring that parolees exhaust administrative alternatives would make little
sense if relevant administrative channels do not already exist. This insight,
combined with a recognition that state DOCs must be involved with the
process, underscores the importance of supplementing new legislation with
new rules and regulations.
C. NON-STATUTORY SOLUTIONS: AFFIRMATIVE RIGHTS AND
PROTECTIONS

Implementing a modified version of RLUIPA’s substantial burden and
strict scrutiny tests to cover heterodox parolees is an attractive solution.
However, because this course of action depends on private litigation for
enforcement, it cannot be relied on exclusively to protect rights while also
lowering costs. This subpart argues that appropriately crafted administrative
rules and regulations offer the cheapest way of protecting the constitutional
rights of parolees, and that these provisions can be modeled off of ones that
are already in effect at the state and federal levels of government.
If new regulation is to be implemented at the federal level, the most
appropriate problem for it to address is the issue of availability, not
accessibility. Both concepts are bound up in the constitutional question of
whether a given use of a religious program violates the Establishment
Clause.183 Availability relates primarily to de jure religious compulsion,
which might include sentencing parolees to specific religious programs or
to rehabilitation generally where the government has failed to approve any
secular programs.184 Accessibility, on the other hand, pertains to de facto
religious compulsion.185 This refers to incidents where there are no secular
alternatives available in the parolee’s state or county.186 A large portion of
state DOCs’ responsibilities must be carried out at the county level, with
local geography, crime, and infrastructure in mind. It would be demanding
too much of the federal government to encourage it to regulate at this level
of detail. The federal government can, however, reduce or altogether
eliminate the largest availability gaps with a two-prong approach.
First, the federal government should expand the grasp of its Charitable
Choice regulations so that they are not as easily skirted by religious
contractors and state DOCs. The primary objective of this task would be to
expand its formal referral process, which protects dissenters by ensuring
that alternative programs are available, not to compel more religious
183
184
185
186

See Honeymar, supra note 22, at 469.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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contractors to secularize their charters and services.187 Second, since there
are likely to be at least some states that experience budgetary and logistical
difficulties in carrying out the first step, the federal government should
facilitate compliance and then incentivize further reform. Facilitating
compliance should consist of reasonable subsidies to states for the express
purpose of rounding out their menu of available parole programs for
minimum compliance with the First Amendment. Incentivizing further
reform, on the other hand, should offer additional, more flexible funding to
state DOCs in exchange for specific commitments to improve their parole
infrastructure and thus the level of accessibility their parolees enjoy locally.
CONCLUSION
Although the debate about the constitutionality of using religious
rehabilitation programs to service parolees has consumed the most time and
ink, it is, at least in many ways, one of the least interesting pieces of the
heterodox dilemma. Dozens of heterodox parolees have brought more or
less the same claims over the past twenty-five years.188 The vast majority
spent years litigating before finally being informed that their constitutional
rights had, in fact, been infringed. Although we know that a few, such as
Barry Hazle, won highly lucrative settlements and seem to have been
decisively vindicated,189 it is almost certainly the case that most were less
fortunate. All of these people probably would have preferred to avoid the
punishment they experienced merely for refusing to participate in religious
activities. This alone underscores the legal community’s responsibility to
design and implement new legal instruments that proactively prevent
constitutional abuses, not ones that merely facilitate the expensive, arduous
process of reactively vindicating rights in court. Furthermore, when one
considers the availability of low-risk models to emulate and expand on as
discussed in this Comment, the impetus to design such reforms should be
impossible to ignore.
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See supra Part II.B.
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